27 ideas
21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
19544 | Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske] |
19545 | We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske] |
19547 | Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske] |
19546 | Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske] |
19548 | The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske] |
19549 | P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske] |
19550 | We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske] |
21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |