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All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Perception' and 'works'

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46 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
22317 Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
13455 Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
16895 The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / c. Logical sets
3328 Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9179 Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
13473 Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
6076 For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn]
3319 Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
9871 Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
16884 Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
3331 If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
16880 Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge]
8689 Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
5657 Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
3318 Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16885 To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
7630 Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
16887 Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
16894 An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7632 Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
7635 Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7638 One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
7642 The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
7640 Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund]
7641 Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
16882 The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
7637 Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
5816 Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
7307 A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
7309 Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
7312 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
7725 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7316 Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
3307 Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA]