Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Aspects of Scientific Explanation' and 'Essence and Modality'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11171 Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11151 An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11161 Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
11160 Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
11158 Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10936 Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11165 If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
11166 The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
22179 Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
6755 For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird]
17083 The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13052 Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
11170 Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
11172 The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]