42 ideas
23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle] |
5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle] |
5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle] |
5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle] |
5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle] |
5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle] |
5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle] |
5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle] |
5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle] |
1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle] |
5861 | People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |