Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'works' and 'Introduction to the Theory of Logic'

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32 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10888 Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
10889 The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo]
10890 A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
10886 Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
10887 Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10897 A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10893 Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo]
10899 Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
10896 Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
10898 The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo]
10902 We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
10892 We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10895 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo]
10900 Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
10894 A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo]
10901 Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10903 A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
3338 Numbers have been defined in terms of 'successors' to the concept of 'zero' [Peano, by Blackburn]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
5897 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
10891 If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]