Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress' and 'Rationality and Logic'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
11051 Frege's logical approach dominates the analytical tradition [Hanna]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
11054 Scientism says most knowledge comes from the exact sciences [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
11071 'Affirming the consequent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ψ, so φ [Hanna]
11070 'Denying the antecedent' fallacy: φ→ψ, ¬φ, so ¬ψ [Hanna]
11088 We can list at least fourteen informal fallacies [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
11059 Circular arguments are formally valid, though informally inadmissible [Hanna]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
11089 Formally, composition and division fallacies occur in mereology [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
11058 Logic is explanatorily and ontologically dependent on rational animals [Hanna]
11072 Logic is personal and variable, but it has a universal core [Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
11061 Intensional consequence is based on the content of the concepts [Hanna]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
11063 Logicism struggles because there is no decent theory of analyticity [Hanna]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
11055 Supervenience can add covariation, upward dependence, and nomological connection [Hanna]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
18435 Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
11083 A sentence is necessary if it is true in a set of worlds, and nonfalse in the other worlds [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
11086 Metaphysical necessity can be 'weak' (same as logical) and 'strong' (based on essences) [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
11084 Logical necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds, because of laws and concepts [Hanna]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
11085 Nomological necessity is truth in all logically possible worlds with our laws [Hanna]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
11077 Intuition includes apriority, clarity, modality, authority, fallibility and no inferences [Hanna]
11080 Intuition is more like memory, imagination or understanding, than like perception [Hanna]
11078 Intuition is only outside the 'space of reasons' if all reasons are inferential [Hanna]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
11053 Explanatory reduction is stronger than ontological reduction [Hanna]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
11081 Imagination grasps abstracta, generates images, and has its own correctness conditions [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
11082 Should we take the 'depictivist' or the 'descriptivist/propositionalist' view of mental imagery? [Hanna]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
11046 Kantian principled rationality is recognition of a priori universal truths [Hanna]
11048 Humean Instrumental rationality is the capacity to seek contingent truths [Hanna]
11067 Rational animals have a normative concept of necessity [Hanna]
11047 Hegelian holistic rationality is the capacity to seek coherence [Hanna]
11068 One tradition says talking is the essence of rationality; the other says the essence is logic [Hanna]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
11045 Most psychologists are now cognitivists [Hanna]