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All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'A Rsum of Metaphysics' and 'Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
21955 My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
16931 Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
16918 Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
16919 Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant]
16930 Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
16920 Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
16929 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
16910 Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant]
16917 All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
16928 Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
11833 The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
21957 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
16923 I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant]
21441 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
16916 A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
16915 A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
16914 A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
21447 I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
16924 I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
16913 I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
16925 Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
16911 Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
16912 Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
16926 Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant]
16927 Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
5049 Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
16922 Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
16921 If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
5048 Perfection is simply quantity of reality [Leibniz]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
5050 Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure [Leibniz]