Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Science without Numbers' and 'Problems in Personal Identity'

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34 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
In logic identity involves reflexivity (x=x), symmetry (if x=y, then y=x) and transitivity (if x=y and y=z, then x=z) [Baillie]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro]
Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H]
Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H]
Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H]
Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 4. Abstracta by Example
'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H]