38 ideas
22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |
8337 | Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie] |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
8343 | Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie] |
8385 | A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane] |
8335 | Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie] |
8336 | The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie] |
8333 | A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie] |
8395 | Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley] |
8334 | The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie] |