Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Analyzing Modality' and 'The Later Works (17 vols, ed Boydston)'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey]
Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey]