Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'An Essay on Free Will' and 'Rationality in Action'

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47 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
3811 Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
3822 Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3806 Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
3812 Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
3809 If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
3810 In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3841 Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
3833 A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
3837 We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
3816 Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
3828 Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
3831 Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3830 In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
3823 Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
3821 Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
3824 A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
3834 An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
3825 Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
3817 Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
3808 Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
3818 We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
6981 Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
3814 Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
3840 We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
3815 The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
3839 Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
3835 If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
3836 If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
3838 Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3813 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]