33 ideas
1642 | We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato] |
17266 | Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder] |
1645 | The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato] |
17263 | Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder] |
287 | Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato] |
1644 | Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato] |
20478 | In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato] |
11278 | What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato] |
1643 | If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato] |
7022 | To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato] |
17270 | Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder] |
17268 | Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder] |
1641 | Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato] |
17267 | The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder] |
10784 | Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16122 | Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato] |
10422 | The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
15855 | If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
1637 | A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
1636 | Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato] |
1638 | Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato] |