62 ideas
162 | Can we understand an individual soul without knowing the soul in general? [Plato] |
160 | The highest ability in man is the ability to discuss unity and plurality in the nature of things [Plato] |
166 | A speaker should be able to divide a subject, right down to the limits of divisibility [Plato] |
12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
7953 | Reasoning needs to cut nature accurately at the joints [Plato] |
13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
16121 | I revere anyone who can discern a single thing that encompasses many things [Plato] |
19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
153 | It takes a person to understand, by using universals, and by using reason to create a unity out of sense-impressions [Plato] |
154 | We would have an overpowering love of knowledge if we had a pure idea of it - as with the other Forms [Plato] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
151 | True knowledge is of the reality behind sense experience [Plato] |
19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
165 | If the apparent facts strongly conflict with probability, it is in everyone's interests to suppress the facts [Plato] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
9296 | The soul is self-motion [Plato] |
13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
23997 | Plato saw emotions and appetites as wild horses, in need of taming [Plato, by Goldie] |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
159 | Only a good philosopher can be a good speaker [Plato] |
5946 | 'Phaedrus' pioneers the notion of philosophical rhetoric [Lawson-Tancred on Plato] |
158 | An excellent speech seems to imply a knowledge of the truth in the mind of the speaker [Plato] |
155 | Beauty is the clearest and most lovely of the Forms [Plato] |
143 | The two ruling human principles are the natural desire for pleasure, and an acquired love of virtue [Plato] |
157 | Most pleasure is release from pain, and is therefore not worthwhile [Plato] |
144 | Reason impels us towards excellence, which teaches us self-control [Plato] |
156 | Bad people are never really friends with one another [Plato] |
13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |
148 | If the prime origin is destroyed, it will not come into being again out of anything [Plato] |
152 | The mind of God is fully satisfied and happy with a vision of reality and truth [Plato] |
150 | We cannot conceive of God, so we have to think of Him as an immortal version of ourselves [Plato] |
149 | There isn't a single reason for positing the existence of immortal beings [Plato] |
146 | Soul is always in motion, so it must be self-moving and immortal [Plato] |