62 ideas
5278 | Philosophy is no more than abstractions concerning observations of human historical development [Marx/Engels] |
5287 | Philosophical problems are resolved into empirical facts [Marx/Engels] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
23872 | 'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels] |
5277 | Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels] |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
5280 | Language co-exists with consciousness, and makes it social [Marx/Engels] |
5276 | The nature of an individual coincides with what they produce and how they produce it [Marx/Engels] |
5281 | Consciousness is a social product [Marx/Engels] |
5289 | When aristocracy or the bourgeoisie dominate, certain values dominate with them [Marx/Engels] |
5274 | Young Hegelians proposed changing our present consciousness for liberating critical consciousness [Marx/Engels] |
21992 | Producing their own subsistence distinguishes men from animals [Marx/Engels] |
5275 | Men distinguish themselves from animals when they begin to produce their means of subsistence [Marx/Engels] |
5292 | Individuals are mutually hostile unless they group together in competition with other groups [Marx/Engels] |
5293 | Only in community are people able to cultivate their gifts, and therefore be free [Marx/Engels] |
5273 | Young Hegelians think consciousness is chains for men, where old Hegelians think it the bond of society [Marx/Engels] |
5283 | In communist society we are not trapped in one activity, but can act freely [Marx/Engels] |
5282 | If the common interest imposes on the individual, his actions become alienated and enslaving [Marx/Engels] |
5288 | The class controlling material production also controls mental production [Marx/Engels] |
5290 | The revolutionary class is opposed to 'class', and represents all of society [Marx/Engels] |
5294 | To assert themselves as individuals, the proletarians must overthrow the State [Marx/Engels] |
5285 | Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine [Marx/Engels] |
5284 | Communism abolishes private property and dissolves the powerful world market [Marx/Engels] |
5291 | The law says private property is the result of the general will [Marx/Engels] |
5279 | Human history must always be studied in relation to industry and exchange [Marx/Engels] |
5286 | Most historians are trapped in the illusions of their own epoch [Marx/Engels] |