Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Mere Possibilities' and 'On the True Doctrine (Against Christians)'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker]
16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker]
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
16437 Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
1868 The world was made as much for animals as for man [Celsus]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
1867 Christians presented Jesus as a new kind of logos to oppose that of the philosophers [Celsus]