Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Either/Or: a fragment of life' and 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness'

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38 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
22087 Philosophy fails to articulate the continual becoming of existence [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
5651 Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
9065 S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9064 Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
9044 If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
9048 The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
9055 The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9049 Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
9056 Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
9058 Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
9059 The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
9060 Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
9050 A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
9061 People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
9062 If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
9063 How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9045 Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
9047 Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
9053 If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
22090 For me time stands still, and I with it [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
9305 The plebeians bore others; only the nobility bore themselves [Kierkegaard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
5650 Reason is just abstractions, so our essence needs a subjective 'leap of faith' [Kierkegaard, by Scruton]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
22095 There are aesthetic, ethical and religious subjectivity [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
20747 What matters is not right choice, but energy, earnestness and pathos in the choosing [Kierkegaard]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
22091 Kierkegaard prioritises the inward individual, rather than community [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
22088 Faith is like a dancer's leap, going up to God, but also back to earth [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle]