48 ideas
3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
13076 | Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
13102 | If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13103 | Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13104 | Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13100 | Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13068 | We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13069 | The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13072 | Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
17080 | Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
13101 | Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
13071 | We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |