Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Ancient Thought in Modern Physics' and 'A Structural Account of Mathematics'

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30 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
9550 We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara]
9562 In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara]
9572 Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara]
9573 The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
9551 What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
9549 The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
9571 ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
9563 A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
9561 The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
9552 Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
9553 Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
10192 We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
9559 If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
9566 No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
6552 You can only explain the qualities of large objects using entities which lack those qualities [Heisenberg]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
9568 I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
9547 Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
9574 'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara]