Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Model Theory' and 'Word and Object'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
6891 Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
6310 Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
10476 The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
10478 Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10477 |= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12798 Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
10474 |= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10473 Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W]
10475 A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W]
10481 Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
17905 Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
10480 First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
9556 Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
16462 The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15490 Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8464 Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine]
7924 The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
8482 Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine]
12136 Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
17594 We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
15725 Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
15722 Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
15719 We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine]
15721 Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine]
15724 Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine]
15720 What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
4630 Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
3131 Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3988 Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine]
6311 The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine]
6312 We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine]
6313 Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine]
6317 Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
6315 We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine]
6314 Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine]