Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Substance and Individuation in Leibniz', 'Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic' and 'Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix'

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25 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
13639 Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21557 Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13076 Scholastics treat relations as two separate predicates of the relata [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
13102 If you individuate things by their origin, you still have to individuate the origins themselves [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
13103 Numerical difference is a symmetrical notion, unlike proper individuation [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13104 Haecceity as property, or as colourless thisness, or as singleton set [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
13100 Maybe 'substance' is more of a mass-noun than a count-noun [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13068 We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
13069 The general assumption is that substances cannot possibly be non-substances [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13072 Modern essences are sets of essential predicate-functions [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
17080 Modern essentialists express essence as functions from worlds to extensions for predicates [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
13101 Necessity-of-origin won't distinguish ex nihilo creations, or things sharing an origin [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
13081 Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
20189 Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
21309 A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
13071 We can go beyond mere causal explanations if we believe in an 'order of being' [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
15755 Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
5323 Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
21311 Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21312 Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
21308 We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
21310 Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
23115 We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
16946 Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume]
15250 If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]