Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Future for Presentism', 'Identity' and 'Letters to Thomasius'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
14018 Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
14008 The redundancy theory conflates metalinguistic bivalence with object-language excluded middle [Bourne]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
16014 It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
14010 All relations between spatio-temporal objects are either spatio-temporal, or causal [Bourne]
14009 It is a necessary condition for the existence of relations that both of the relata exist [Bourne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
13432 The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16024 I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
16023 Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
16015 Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
16017 Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
16016 Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
16020 Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16018 Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
16019 Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
12696 Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
14016 The idea of simultaneity in Special Relativity is full of verificationist assumptions [Bourne]
14019 Relativity denies simultaneity, so it needs past, present and future (unlike Presentism) [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
14013 Special Relativity allows an absolute past, future, elsewhere and simultaneity [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
14015 No-Futurists believe in past and present, but not future, and say the world grows as facts increase [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14007 How can presentists talk of 'earlier than', and distinguish past from future? [Bourne]
14011 Presentism seems to deny causation, because the cause and the effect can never coexist [Bourne]
14017 Since presentists treat the presentness of events as basic, simultaneity should be define by that means [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
14003 Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne]
14005 B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
14006 Time flows, past is fixed, future is open, future is feared but not past, we remember past, we plan future [Bourne]