15 ideas
| 14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
| 15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
| 15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
| 15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
| 15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
| 15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
| 15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
| 579 | Cratylus said you couldn't even step into the same river once [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
| 14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
| 14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
| 14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 578 | Cratylus decided speech was hopeless, and his only expression was the movement of a finger [Cratylus, by Aristotle] |
| 14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
| 15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |