Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Real Natures and Familiar Objects', 'Scientific Essentialism' and 'Justice: What's the right thing to do?'

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59 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel]
Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis]
Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis]
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis]
Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Good explanations unify [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel]
Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel]
Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 5. Persons as Ends
Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel]
A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel]
Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel]
Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel]
Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel]
Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel]
Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis]
What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis]
Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis]
The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis]