117 ideas
| 13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
| 16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
| 7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
| 7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
| 7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
| 13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
| 10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
| 16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
| 16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
| 7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
| 16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
| 16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
| 9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
| 13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
| 13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
| 17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
| 17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
| 13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
| 10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
| 8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
| 17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
| 13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
| 13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
| 13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
| 13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
| 13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
| 13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
| 13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
| 7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
| 13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
| 13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
| 16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
| 16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
| 13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
| 7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
| 7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
| 7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
| 7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
| 13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
| 7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
| 16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
| 7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
| 16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
| 7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
| 7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
| 7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
| 16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
| 7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
| 7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
| 7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
| 7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
| 7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
| 7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
| 7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
| 7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
| 9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
| 13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
| 7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
| 7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
| 7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
| 7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
| 16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
| 16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
| 16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
| 16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
| 16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
| 16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
| 16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
| 16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
| 16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
| 7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
| 7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
| 7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
| 7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
| 7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
| 7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
| 7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
| 7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
| 7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
| 7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
| 7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
| 7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
| 7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
| 7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
| 7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
| 7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
| 7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
| 7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
| 7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
| 7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
| 7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
| 7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
| 13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
| 13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
| 13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
| 13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
| 7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
| 13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
| 13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
| 16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
| 17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
| 16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
| 16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
| 16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
| 7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
| 16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
| 7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
| 7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |