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All the ideas for 'Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects', 'Mind and World' and 'The World as Will and Idea'

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84 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer]
Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C]
What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C]
The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C]
Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]
The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer]
The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer]
We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth]
All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer]
Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 6. Value of Art
The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner]
Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer]