56 ideas
9307 | Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen] |
13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
9297 | You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen] |
13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
9308 | If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen] |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
9309 | Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen] |
13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
9304 | Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen] |
9298 | We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen] |
9301 | Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen] |
9302 | We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen] |
9310 | The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen] |
9311 | We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen] |
9303 | The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen] |