132 ideas
13860 | We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C] |
16395 | Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker] |
17034 | Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke] |
13883 | The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C] |
4955 | Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke] |
10142 | The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
10559 | Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta] |
10437 | Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4949 | Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
4951 | A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke] |
17031 | A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke] |
8957 | Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó] |
10428 | Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4959 | A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke] |
9868 | An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
13861 | Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C] |
13892 | One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C] |
13867 | Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
17441 | Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13862 | There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C] |
17853 | Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C] |
17854 | What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C] |
13894 | Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C] |
10140 | We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K] |
8692 | Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend] |
17440 | Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck] |
13893 | It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C] |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
13869 | Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C] |
13870 | We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C] |
13873 | Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C] |
13899 | The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C] |
13896 | The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C] |
7804 | Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA] |
13863 | Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C] |
13895 | The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C] |
13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
14896 | Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross] |
13877 | Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C] |
9878 | Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett] |
17647 | Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam] |
13868 | Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C] |
16995 | Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke] |
17047 | If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke] |
5450 | For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner] |
17055 | Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke] |
16997 | An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke] |
17045 | De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke] |
17030 | Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke] |
16955 | Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett] |
16996 | Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke] |
13971 | Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames] |
12100 | An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt] |
16991 | No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke] |
11867 | If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins] |
12018 | Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G] |
17046 | Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke] |
8274 | Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke] |
17036 | Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke] |
17038 | If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke] |
11880 | Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P] |
4797 | Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos] |
17037 | Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke] |
4728 | Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady] |
16990 | A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke] |
9386 | The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke] |
4960 | "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke] |
4966 | Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke] |
2408 | Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers] |
13967 | Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke] |
13970 | Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames] |
16992 | Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke] |
16993 | If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke] |
16998 | Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke] |
17001 | A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke] |
4952 | Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke] |
7761 | Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan] |
7693 | Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette] |
5821 | Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam] |
14068 | If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke] |
10436 | A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4953 | We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke] |
4961 | It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke] |
16986 | That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke] |
8259 | Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe] |
16989 | Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke] |
4947 | A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke] |
13975 | Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames] |
17048 | Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke] |
4948 | Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke] |
4958 | Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke] |
4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
7430 | Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke] |
7867 | If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau] |
3228 | Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey] |
5832 | Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP] |
4968 | Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke] |
13866 | A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C] |
13865 | 'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C] |
13890 | Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C] |
13898 | If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C] |
13882 | A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C] |
13885 | If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C] |
17874 | Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke] |
16394 | Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke] |
5822 | The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke] |
17033 | We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke] |
10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
4689 | Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn] |
17504 | Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam] |
17035 | We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke] |
16988 | Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG] |
17029 | It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke] |
10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
17857 | We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C] |
14893 | Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Maciŕ/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |
17056 | Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke] |
4963 | The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke] |
17053 | Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke] |
4964 | 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke] |
6765 | Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird] |
9387 | The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke] |
17054 | Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke] |
17057 | Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
4965 | Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke] |
17050 | Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke] |
17051 | The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke] |
17049 | 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke] |