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All the ideas for 'Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects', 'Experimental Researches in Electricity' and 'Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue'

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66 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C]
What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C]
The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C]
Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]
The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant]
Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant]
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant]
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant]
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant]
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant]
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant]
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant]
Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant]
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Faraday's single field of variable forces introduces a criterion of Unity into what is ultimate [Faraday, by Harré/Madden]