20 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |