26 ideas
| 9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
| 5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
| 5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
| 9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
| 17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
| 9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
| 9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
| 9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
| 9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
| 9577 | The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
| 9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
| 9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
| 9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
| 9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
| 9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
| 9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
| 5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
| 5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
| 5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
| 541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
| 542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |