14 ideas
| 17082 | Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't? [Ruben] |
| 12732 | Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes [Leibniz] |
| 17087 | The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically [Ruben] |
| 17081 | Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation [Ruben] |
| 17092 | An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure [Ruben] |
| 17090 | Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments [Ruben] |
| 17094 | The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal [Ruben] |
| 17088 | Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation [Ruben] |
| 17089 | Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately [Ruben] |
| 19438 | Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments [Leibniz] |
| 19415 | Passions reside in confused perceptions [Leibniz] |
| 541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
| 19439 | God produces possibilities, and thus ideas [Leibniz] |
| 542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |