10 ideas
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |