14 ideas
| 20728 | Metaphysics is hopeless with its present epistemology; common-sense realism is needed [Colvin] |
| 14620 | Theories in logic are sentences closed under consequence, but in truth discussions theories have axioms [Fine,K] |
| 20726 | We can only distinguish self from non-self if there is an inflexible external reality [Colvin] |
| 20727 | Common-sense realism rests on our interests and practical life [Colvin] |
| 20729 | Arguments that objects are unknowable or non-existent assume the knower's existence [Colvin] |
| 20730 | If objects are doubted because their appearances change, that presupposes one object [Colvin] |
| 20731 | The idea that everything is relations is contradictory; relations are part of the concept of things [Colvin] |
| 14530 | The role of semantic necessity in semantics is like metaphysical necessity in metaphysics [Fine,K, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
| 14618 | Semantics is either an assignment of semantic values, or a theory of truth [Fine,K] |
| 14621 | Semantics is a body of semantic requirements, not semantic truths or assigned values [Fine,K] |
| 14622 | Referential semantics (unlike Fregeanism) allows objects themselves in to semantic requirements [Fine,K] |
| 14619 | The Quinean doubt: are semantics and facts separate, and do analytic sentences have no factual part? [Fine,K] |
| 541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
| 542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |