Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Moral Problem' and 'De Legibus Naturae'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
6222 If a decision is in accord with right reason, everyone can agree with it [Cumberland]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
6217 Natural law is supplied to the human mind by reality and human nature [Cumberland]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
6221 If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
541 Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
6218 The happiness of individuals is linked to the happiness of everyone (which is individuals taken together) [Cumberland]
6220 The happiness of all contains the happiness of each, and promotes it [Cumberland]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
6216 Natural law is immutable truth giving moral truths and duties independent of society [Cumberland]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
542 Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias]