14 ideas
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
| 23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
| 23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 541 | Virtue comes more from habit than character [Critias] |
| 23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
| 542 | Fear of the gods was invented to discourage secret sin [Critias] |