Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth' and 'Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix'

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27 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume]
If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]