Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Value Theory' and 'Ontological Relativity'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
1633 Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
18964 Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
18965 We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
1634 Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
8470 Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
18963 Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
5996 Critolaus redefined Aristotle's moral aim as fulfilment instead of happiness [Critolaus, by White,SA]