Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Nature and Observability of Causal Relations', 'Lives of Eminent Philosophers' and 'Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
3035 Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
8368 A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18369 There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19318 A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
19319 If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19320 If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
19315 In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
19317 An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
19322 Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
1816 Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
1819 Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
3064 When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3033 Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
1838 Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
1769 Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8367 Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8372 We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8369 Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
8373 When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
8370 A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8371 Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8374 We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]