29 ideas
7426 | Critical philosophy is what questions domination at every level [Foucault] |
17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
7423 | Philosophy and politics are fundamentally linked [Foucault] |
7420 | When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault] |
8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
7424 | Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault] |
17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
7422 | A subject is a form which can change, in (say) political or sexual situations [Foucault] |
17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
7419 | Ethics is the conscious practice of freedom [Foucault] |
7425 | The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault] |
7418 | The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault] |
8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |
17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |