21 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
| 21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
| 21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
| 21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
| 21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
| 21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
| 21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
| 21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |
| 8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| 8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
| 8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
| 8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
| 8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
| 8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |
| 22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |