Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Nature and Observability of Causal Relations', 'A Powers Theory of Modality' and 'Giordano Bruno and Hermetic Tradition'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
The magic of Asclepius enters Renaissance thought mixed into Ficino's neo-platonism [Yates]
The dating, in 1614, of the Hermetic writings as post-Christian is the end of the Renaissance [Yates]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs]
Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]