21 ideas
| 8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
| 8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
| 6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
| 8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
| 19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
| 19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
| 19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
| 19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
| 19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
| 8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
| 10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
| 10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
| 8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
| 8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
| 8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| 8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
| 8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
| 8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
| 8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
| 8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |