14 ideas
8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |