65 ideas
18290 | But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche] |
7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
18303 | Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche] |
7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
18305 | To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
20757 | The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche] |
7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
18289 | Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
18299 | The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche] |
18297 | We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche] |
18293 | The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche] |
18301 | We only really love children and work [Nietzsche] |
18307 | I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche] |
18291 | Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche] |
18287 | People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche] |
18295 | If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche] |
18286 | The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche] |
18296 | An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche] |
18294 | The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche] |
18304 | Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche] |
18300 | Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche] |
18302 | Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche] |
18292 | I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche] |
18298 | Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche] |
18288 | Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche] |
18306 | We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche] |