13 ideas
| 14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
| 14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
| 7751 | Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice] |
| 7752 | Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice] |
| 7753 | We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice] |
| 14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
| 14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |