12 ideas
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
| 5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
| 5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
| 4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
| 21798 | To universalise 'give everything to the poor' leads to absurdity [Hegel] |
| 21797 | Immortality does not come at a later time, but when pure knowing Spirit fully grasps the universal [Hegel] |