35 ideas
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
20400 | Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S] |
7266 | The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
7267 | Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
7268 | The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
7269 | The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
7271 | Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley] |
13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |
13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |