Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Facts of Causation', 'The Question of Realism' and 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
15053 If metaphysics can't be settled, it hardly matters whether it makes sense [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
15054 'Quietist' says abandon metaphysics because answers are unattainable (as in Kant's noumenon) [Fine,K]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10365 We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
15007 If you make 'grounding' fundamental, you have to mention some non-fundamental notions [Sider on Fine,K]
15006 Something is grounded when it holds, and is explained, and necessitated by something else [Fine,K, by Sider]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
15055 Grounding relations are best expressed as relations between sentences [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
15050 Reduction might be producing a sentence which gets closer to the logical form [Fine,K]
15051 Reduction might be semantic, where a reduced sentence is understood through its reduction [Fine,K]
15052 Reduction is modal, if the reductions necessarily entail the truth of the target sentence [Fine,K]
15056 The notion of reduction (unlike that of 'ground') implies the unreality of what is reduced [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
15047 What is real can only be settled in terms of 'ground' [Fine,K]
15046 Reality is a primitive metaphysical concept, which cannot be understood in other terms [Fine,K]
15060 Why should what is explanatorily basic be therefore more real? [Fine,K]
15048 In metaphysics, reality is regarded as either 'factual', or as 'fundamental' [Fine,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
15061 Although colour depends on us, we can describe the world that way if it picks out fundamentals [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
15059 Grounding is an explanation of truth, and needs all the virtues of good explanations [Fine,K]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 10. Rule Following
19271 No rule can be fully explained [Kripke]
19269 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
7305 Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A]
19270 If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
11076 Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
15058 A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
11075 The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
4785 Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8408 Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]