10 ideas
| 21953 | For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |