28 ideas
| 9108 | From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham] |
| 9107 | A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham] |
| 16300 | Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach] |
| 8525 | Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 9106 | The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham] |
| 9113 | Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham] |
| 9110 | The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham] |
| 8518 | Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
| 8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
| 8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
| 8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
| 8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 15388 | Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham] |
| 8521 | Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 8515 | Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 8519 | Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K] |
| 9109 | If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham] |
| 4033 | Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K] |
| 8512 | Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K] |
| 9105 | Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham] |
| 8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
| 8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |